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INTRODUCTION
In recent years the world has been through a series of dramatic changes. Financial systems have become more complex and diverse, and this has led to a corresponding increase in the risk management techniques in place by financial institutions and their regulators. The continuous evolution of risk management systems is also attributed to the economic crises that are witnessed time and again. Stress-testing as a risk management tool gained prominence after the East-Asian debacle and is now propagated as a widely accepted mechanism to identify potential vulnerabilities to the system. It was a major component of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAPs) launched by the IMF and World Bank in the late 1990's.
However, till date its use and applicability by individual institutions is very restricted.
Here is a case in point. Consider the following scenario adapted from an IMF Working paper by Jones, Hilbers and Slack (2004) :
There is an increase in housing prices because of rapid employment growth, rising household disposable incomes, and low interest rates-all of which contribute to a spiral increase in mortgage lending. Bank balance sheets and income statements indicate a strong dependence on mortgage lending in both the stock of assets and in the flow of income. Suppose now that we see a rise in unemployment and a fall in disposable incomes, as is the case in the current financial crises. A stress test for bank balance sheets could help assess the possible impact for these institutions.
If rational stress management systems and proper implementation of their results had been in place, the losses due to the current crises would have been far less, as institutions would have stepped up their capital adequacy requirements. Therefore, there is an urgent need to lay greater emphasis on stress testing, especially at the macro level to assess possible losses and take suitable action before hand.
The purpose of stress testing is not to identify when will the next crisis happen, but to estimate the impact of extreme but plausible shocks on the financial system. Individual banks use stress tests to make risks more transparent for capital allocation decisions, while central banks use them to ensure that monetary policies meet objectives of price stability, exchange stability, full employment, maximum output and high rate of growth.
The paper is divided into three broad sections. Section I provides an overview of macro stress testing. This encompasses issues of scope, design and calibration of a macro stress scenario, assessment of vulnerability to specific risk factors, integration of market and credit risks and feedback effects. Section II deals with two broad approaches to macro stress testing: the 'piece-wise' and 'integrated' approach. The two approaches have been exemplified with the help of existing literature on the subject. Section III explains the methodological challenges faced by regulators and financial institutions, addressing which will help make their results more comprehensive and robust. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
OVERVIEW OF MACRO-STRESS TESTING
As illustrated in the BIS Working Paper by Marco macro stress tests can be performed in a number of stages including:
• Defining the scope of the analysis in terms of the relevant set of institutions and portfolios
• Designing and calibrating a macroeconomic stress scenario
• Quantifying the direct impact of the stimulated scenario on the balance sheet of the financial sector, either focusing on forecasting single financial soundness indicators (FSIs) under stress or integrating the analysis of market and credit risks into a single estimate of the probability distribution of aggregate losses that could materialize in the stimulated stress scenario
• Interpreting results to evaluate the overall risk bearing capacity of the financial system • Accounting for potential feedback effects both within the financial system and from the financial sector on to the real economy Sorge says that the possible consequences for financial stability of a macroeconomic stress scenario can be evaluated as follows:
where:
• indicates the uncertain future realization of an aggregate measure of distress for the financial system in the event of a simulated stress scenario (i.e. conditional on a tail realization).
• Ω is the risk metric used to compare financial system vulnerability across portfolios and scenarios.
• f(.) is the loss function that maps an initial set of macroeconomic shocks to the final impact measured on the aggregate portfolio of the financial sector. This function includes risk exposures, default probabilities correlations, feed back effects etc.
• X represents the history of past realizations of macroeconomic variables and Z represents the other relevant factors.
Scope
The most important question here is to identify the set of relevant financial institutions for stress testing analysis. From a stability point of view, the analysis can be restricted to the major banks if non-bank financial institutions (eg: insurance companies, pension funds) do not present a systemic threat to the operation of the financial system. As Jones, Hilbert and Slack (2004) note, ' The coverage of the stress testing exercise should be broad enough to represent a meaningful critical mass of the financial system, while keeping the number of institutions covered at a feasible level'. They propose the set up of a cut off point in terms of the total market share of institutions involved. If they are significant inter-linkages between the bank and non-bank financial entities then excluding the non-bank entities from the analysis would forbid us from identifying several potential vulnerabilities to the system.
Other key questions in this domain relate to which specific asset classes in a financial institution should be used? Should institutions of foreign ownership be taken into account? There may be countries in which foreign owned institutions transmit and absorb shocks depending on the parent company's health. For instance, the LTCM collapse affected prominent institutions in countries like Italy, Kuwait, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.
Another dilemma exists with respect to risk exposure. Should it be measured both in the trading and the banking books? Moreover, the portfolios of institutions are in continuous evolution over time according to changing hedging and investment strategies. This makes the task of quantifying risk exposure even more difficult. Identifying the relevant portfolio becomes a problem due to data constraints. The book on Financial Sector Assessment by IMF and World Bank (2005) lists four forms of data limitations:
• Basic data availability: This is true of countries where information on balance sheet exposures may not be available.
• Difficulty isolating specific exposures: This is mainly a problem of large institutions with complex structures.
• Lack of risk data: Countries where risk management systems are less sophisticated may have little data on duration or default measures etc.
• Confidentiality issues: These arise due to limitations on what supervisors are legally able to share with other parties.
Because of these constraints, much of the existing literature has focused on constructing hypothetical portfolios whose composition mimics distribution of assets and risk exposures in a system.
Design and Calibration of Stress Scenario
Firstly, the most important question to answer in this context is the choice of type of risks to analyse. The most widely used ones are:
• Market Risk: It is defined as the risk of losses on a portfolio arising from movements in market prices 1 . The four standard market risk factors are- Fourthly, the type of scenario used to conduct the stress tests is critical to our analysis.
The historical scenario approach is based on past realizations, using shocks that occurred in the past as a benchmark for future analysis. The figures given above illustrate the loss distribution due to an interest rate shock. They also illustrate an important aspect i.e. the choice of the time horizon -the losses for the three-year horizon are in greater percentage than the one-year horizon. It is very important to select the appropriate horizon for measuring losses; else our inferences may be biased.
Monte Carlo simulations use techniques to look jointly at the sensitivities and probability distributions of various input variables. They are carried out in two principle ways: (i) by the generation of random values of input variables based upon a hypothetical joint distribution of input variables and (ii) by bootstrapping using empirical data.
An important concern in calibration is that of taking second round effects into account.
For example, an oil price shock will not only affect the GDP, but factors such as inflation, interest rates etc. proposes the use of structural macroeconometric models that should be employed fully to characterize the interacting shocks affecting key real economy indicators or asset prices that define the scenario of interest.
Assessing vulnerability to specific risk factors
Jones, Hilbers and Slack (2004) list down macro-level, structural and financial soundness indicators that can be used to identify vulnerabilities in the system. At the macro level, information from the following sectors can be utilized,
• Real Sector: Indicators such as the growth performance of the economy relative to potential growth rates for consumption, investment and incomes; unemployment rates; inflationary pressures on consumer, wholesale and asset prices can be used.
For the household and corporate sectors, these would include measures of indebtedness, leverage, income growth and debt servicing stability.
• Government Sector: Indicators of relative magnitude of the government deficit, debt stock, and associated debt sustainability; the size of the present fiscal impulse; and how the government budget is financed.
• External Sector: Indicators of the magnitude of current account deficit, official reserves, and how the deficit is financed; the relative size, maturity structure and currency composition of external debt; the extent of exchange rate misalignment and whether there are any pressures on the exchange rate.
Following have been identified as the key structural indicators:
• Ownership and market shares: This data could include total assets or profits, broken down by bank, institutions or other sectors.
• Balance sheet structures: These can be used to analyze growth rates of credit by various types of institutions and to different sectors.
• Flow of funds accounts: They provide insights into the patterns of intermediation in the economy, and trends in fund raising by different sectors and instruments. Use of the individual balance sheet measures characterizes the 'piece-wise approach', which we shall discuss in the following section. A comprehensive picture of system wide vulnerabilities can be obtained by studying dependencies among FSIs. This is what we shall come to know as the 'integrated approach'.
Integrating market and credit risks
Sorge (2004) gives a brief description of methods used to assess losses due to market and credit risks. Losses due to market risk are estimated using: (i) Local valuation methods that use first and second order approximations to capture sensitivity of the portfolio around its present market value and then estimate the loss distribution under different stress scenarios; or (ii) Full valuation methods that re-estimate the value of the portfolio in different scenarios using a new vector of prices inferred from historical analysis or drawn from known distributions by Monte Carlo simulations. On the other hand, two main models to evaluate credit risk have gained prominence in the literature: (i) Reducedform models that assume an exogenous functional form for the link between default probabilities and a number of primary risk factors whose evolution over time follows data driven stochastic processes; and (ii) Structural models that track the impact of risk factors on the assets and liabilities of obligors and derive default probabilities based on the distance between the expected value of the assets at maturity and the default threshold determined by the level of liabilities.
There is widespread consensus amongst economists that macroeconomic shocks lead both to market losses and changes in the credit quality of the obligors. Therefore, there is a need to come up with models that take both these risks into account. Relatively few studies have attempted to integrate these risks and subsequent discussions of some of these will be presented in our analysis of the integrated approach in the next section.
Aggregation
There are two main approaches used for aggregation.
Bottom-up approach: Under this approach individual institutions perform their own stress tests, which are then aggregated for analysis. This is the approach propagated by IMF's • "Suppose the macro model only produces two interest rates: an overnight cash rate and a 10-year bond rate. An empirical model of the term-structure of interest rates could be used to produce an estimated set of interest rates for a larger set of maturities. In turn, this data could be used to derive credit spreads".
The second mapping happens from the common risk factors into all of the instruments in portfolios of individual institutions. Mostly, these institutions use their own internal models of expertise to develop an appropriate mapping. Jones et al (2004) highlight the use of models for credit scores, transition matrices, or default probabilities as key inputs in understanding the credit risk of a portfolio.
Since different entities employ different methodologies and modeling assumptions, substantial measurement error may be introduced. Besides, if the number of common scenarios to which institutions agree is small we will fail to develop an accurate estimate of the risks associated with a portfolio.
Top down approach: Under this approach, portfolio data is gathered from the relevant institutions and the supervisor uses it to perform stress tests with a common scenario and methodology. This approach is mostly seen in countries where banks do not have sophisticated risk management techniques internally and it becomes necessary for the supervisor to conduct the analysis. Let us illustrate an example here from a paper by Allan Kearns (2006) . The paper stress tests the balance sheet effect of an exchange rate risk in Ireland. It captures the impact of a change in exchange rates and the knock-on revaluation of assets and liabilities held in foreign currencies, and whether the size of the consolidated balance sheet increases or falls when measured in the local currency. 30% appreciation in euro vis-à-vis dollar only 97
Source: 'Top down stress testing: Key Results' by Allan Kearns (2006) As the given table shows, the size of the Irish banks is extremely sensitive to exchange rate risk as a significant share of assets is held in foreign currencies.
Bottom-up v/s Top-down: The top-down approach is more advantageous in the sense that it uses a common methodology and scenario, and is hence, more meaningful.
However, it imposes a higher burden on the supervisors, as they need to develop a certain expertise to conduct the analysis. Blaschke et al (2001) say that supervisors need to have in-depth knowledge of portfolio structures and the strategic direction of firms involved so that a comprehensive analysis can be undertaken. (ii) Interaction between asset prices and bank's portfolio adjustment mechanismshow change in asset prices damage bank's balance sheets, forcing sale of assets and depressing asset prices even further.
(iii) Transmission of shocks between the financial system and the real economyhow turbulences in the banking system affect aggregate supply and demand and the overall economic activity.
(iv) Correlation between credit and market risks-for example, how shocks to interest rates raise default risks, resulting in higher interest rates.
For our analysis here, we will focus on the first three effects in greater detail in the last section on methodological challenges.
MACRO-STRESS TESTING METHODOLOGIES
Piecewise approach:
As the name suggests, the piecewise approach focuses on estimating the impact of a macroeconomic shock on a single financial indicator (such as loan write-offs). A direct economic relationship is estimated using historical data between the macroeconomic variables (X) and the various risk measures (Y). The estimated coefficients are then used to study the vulnerabilities of the financial systems to an adverse scenario. expresses this relationship through the graph given below.
Figure 6 Predicting the impact of macroeconomic shocks on FSIs
Source: BIS Working Papers No 165, Marco In the given figure Y can be taken to be any of the financial soundness indicators we mentioned in the previous section.
There are two broad categories of econometric models found in the literature to conduct analysis under this approach:
(i) Models that use reduced form relationships using either panel or time series data techniques
(ii) Economy wide or inter-industry structural macroeconometric models Sorge discusses the advantages that one model has over the other. Structural models, he says, achieve a more complete characterization of the adverse macro scenario including the repercussions of the original exogenous shock on all other macroeconomic variables.
They help assess the conflicts and tradeoffs arising between the pursuit of monetary and financial stability and evaluate interdependencies and production flows among industries.
However, both models find widespread use because of their easy implementation. The piecewise approach has a limitation in that rigid linear relationships are estimated between bank risk and macro fundamentals, and its lack of ability to characterize the entire loss distribution. Sorge and Virolainen (2006) use historical data from Finland since the early 1990's, when it experienced the most severe recession.
Time series technique Illustration:
Several quarters of negative growth in 1992-1993 were accompanied by a significant increase in the ratio of banks' loan-loss provisions to total loans. The change in this ratio is regressed on the macroeconomic determinants, seasonally adjusted GDP growth and the short-term interest rate to obtain the coefficients shown in the table below. These coefficients are then used to study two macro stress test scenarios: (i) the quarterly real 
Figure 7 GDP and Interest Rate Shock
Source: Sorge and Virolainen (2006) As seen from the above figure, the impact of the interest rate shock is more immediate whereas the GDP effect is more persistent. Once the impact of the shocks is absorbed, loan loss provisions revert to their long-term downward trend. Estimated losses were put at 0.7 % of total loans quarterly. This was far above the actual reported figure of 0.18%.
Panel data technique Illustration:
The IMF, together with the Bank of Spain, Such type of analysis gives us a more comprehensive picture in the sense that we can make inferences both at a broad level and at an intrinsic level of variations between subcategories. In a similar manner, the impact of an increase in risk-weighted assets was studied using a model that links the probability of migration, for each state in the transition matrix, to cyclical factors. The complete model varying from 1 to N-1 is: z ijt = log ( P (rating t <=j | rating t-1 = i ) -log (P (rating t > j | rating t-1 = i ) z ijt = θ ij z ijt-1 + α ij + β ij X t + ε ε ε ε ij,t where X is a vector of macroeconomic variables and ε t is the error term. This model can be used to estimate a stressed transition matrix under different macro scenarios, which
can then be applied to produce a final stressed portfolio and study the impact of a shock on regulatory capital as seen from the figure below. 
Integrated Approach
This approach combines the sensitivity of financial systems to multiple risk factors (both credit and market) into a single estimate of expected losses. conducts an interesting discussion of the approach. He notes that in a mark to market framework, portfolio managers continuously revalue their assets and liabilities under different macro scenarios. A conditional probability distribution of losses can be obtained under every simulated scenario. Value at risk is the most commonly used summary statistic of this distribution. Many recent studies have incorporated macro-fundamentals into value at risk measures as follows:
VaR i,t ( ) = f { E i,t (X t ); P t (X t ); PD t (X t ); LGD t (X t ); ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ t (X t ) X t = h ( X t-1,…….., X t-p ) + ε ε ε ε t where: (2004) 2.2.1 Illustration: Jandacka, Krenn and Breuer (2005) show the importance of integrated credit and market risk measurement as compared to summing up separate risk numbers for credit and market risk. They exemplify this claim with a recent example of the Russian crisis in 1998. Some banks held dollar/rubel forwards with Russian banks and matching rubel/ dollar forwards with US banks. These positions were hedged against exchange rate movements. If one party defaulted, the other could obtain the currency at no loss if the exchange rate stayed the same. Since the rubel regime was managed, a situation of change in exchange rate was highly unlikely. From the perspective of pure credit or market risk, the risk of the portfolio was zero. However, during the 1998 crisis when Russian counterparties defaulted, the value of the rubel also fell drastically. The US banks suffered serious losses, as the deliverables purchased on the market did not give them much rubel in return. The authors conducted an integrated analysis through two methods. Crude integration was carried out by looking at risk numbers for market risk, assuming constant default probability. Full integration was achieved by varying the market and credit risk factors simultaneously according to their joint distribution. Both, the value at risk and expected shortfall figures were found to be higher than those for simple sum of pure market and credit risks.
Sorge (2004) discusses the literature associated with the integrated approach. Allowing the risk parameters specified in the VAR equation above to be state or time dependent helps address concerns of parameter instability. In most recent studies, however, all components of the loss function other than default probabilities have been treated as constant, rather than being modeled endogenously. The approach also allows for nonlinear relationships between macroeconomic shocks and default measures. But, a problem with VAR measures is the non-additivity across portfolios. As a result, most studies focus on an aggregate portfolio that fails to take into account the domino effects among single financial institutions.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
Time horizon effects
The issue about appropriate time horizons is discussed in some detail in a Consultative (iii) Transmission of shocks between the financial system and the real economy:
Most stress tests don't take into account the feedback effect of the stimulated scenario on the real economy. Hosoya and Shimizu (2002) in their review of the impact of a major global economic downturn on the Japanese economy predict a decline in the country's nominal GDP by two percent over the sample period. However, they note that if negative feedback effects through financial and loan markets were taken into account the initial stress scenario required to bring a similar level decline in GDP would be drastically lower. Kick and Koetter (2007) use an integrated micro-macro approach to take into account feed back effects between bank distress in Germany and the real economy. Keith Hall at the Reserve Bank of Australia (2006) suggests an iterative approach to solve the feedback effect problem. This can be done by providing banks with only the first year scenario, say a demand side shock to household and business credit. Banks will adjust credit growth to the new demand conditions and hence macro forecasts based on these estimates will help us develop a second year profile. Policy changes to the scenario could be introduced wherever necessary.
Endogenous parameter Instability
Sorge (2004) testing, piece-wise and integrated approach were studied. While for the piece wise approach, we analyzed case studies using time series, panel and structural data techniques; the integrated approach case study highlighted two key forms of integrationthe crude and full integration techniques. Finally, the section on methodological challenges looked at greater depth into the feedback effects due to inter-bank contagiona classical case of which was the recent Lehman disaster, transmission of shocks between the financial system and the real economy and interaction between asset prices and bank's endogenous portfolio adjustment mechanisms. This section also laid stress on problems of endogenous parameter instability and that they need to be distinguished from exogenous parameter problems.
The issue of stress-testing has never been given as much importance in history as has
been seen in what may be the worst economic depression the world has ever known.
Timothy Geithner, the current United States Secretary of Treasury conducted stress-tests on the nation's biggest banks in May'2009 and has asked 10 of them to raise an estimated total of 75 billion dollars in extra capital by November. However, critics claim that these stress-tests don't potentially account for feedback effects of the stressed scenarios and lack a comprehensive analysis. Such issues and many more are central to the study of stress testing. Attempts should be made to run macro stress tests that provide a holistic picture of the situation and allow adequate capital buffers to be put in place. An attempt has been made to cover the key issues raised in macro stress testing through this paper.
APPENDIX
Sets of Financial Soundness Indicators
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